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Introduction: This article provides highlights of the evolution of the health care rationing
debate towards a more explicit and open approach involving public participation. Discre-
tionarymodels thathavedominated thehealth sector decision-making are beingquestioned
by different sectors of society.
Methods: Using data from 442 college students, we explore public views on public involve-
ment in health care rationing decisions.
Results: Findings suggest that although citizens wish to be consulted, they believe doctors
should play the most important role on rationing decisions.
Discussion: Conﬁdence in doctors is, nonetheless, not independent from the criteria used to
support their decisions.
© 2011 Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública. Published by Elsevier España, S.L.U. All rights
reserved.
Quem deveria participar na deﬁnic¸ão das prioridades em saúde e como
deveriam essas prioridades ser estabelecidas? Resultados de um
inquérito em Portugal
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Introduc¸ão: Este artigo destaca a evoluc¸ão do debate sobre o racionamento dos cuidados de
saúde com vista a uma aproximac¸ão mais explícita e mais aberta que envolva a participac¸ão
articipac¸ão pública
acionamento
uidados de sáude
pública. Osmodelos arbitrários que dominarama tomada de decisão no setor da saúde estão
a ser questionados por diferentes setores da sociedade.
Métodos: Partindo de dados recolhidos com 442 estudantes universitário, foram exploradas
as opiniões sobre a participac¸ão pública no que se refere à tomada de decisão quanto ao
racionamento dos cuidados de saúde.
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Resultados: Os resultados sugerem que embora os cidadãos desejem ser consultados,
acreditam que cabe aos médicos desempenhar o papel mais importante nas decisões de
racionamento.
Discussão: A conﬁanc¸a nos médicos não é, todavia, independente dos critérios usados para
apoiar as suas decisões.
© 2011 Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L.U. Todos osIntroduction
Health care costs have grown faster than overall economic
growth indeveloped countries,making it necessary for explicit
measures dealing with the distribution of health resources to
be included on these countries’ political agendas. Although
the strength of recent political and academic debate may
suggest otherwise, the rationing of health care is not a new
process. What is new is the debate surrounding the need to
conciliate methods of priority setting and public involvement
in decision making.
The economic evaluation approaches to priority setting,
grounded in the principle of maximisation of health bene-
ﬁts by unit of cost, despite having the merit of advancing
the theoretical debate, seem to have had little effect in prac-
tical terms. The greatest objection to economic evaluation
techniques is the inherent difﬁculty of conciliating efﬁciency
principles with social values. In this context, one possi-
ble hypothesis would be to substitute the technical criteria
for a political process of priority setting, which would be
opened up to include the participation of all social actors,
particularly the population. The idea that society should
participate in prioritisation decisions has been widely prop-
agated, but has not yet advanced to the stage of actual
implementation. Although researchers seem to agree that
obtaining the preferences of the population in health mat-
ters is a complex process, there is ample support for public
involvement.1–4 The controversy surrounding public involve-
ment in prioritisation decisions involves not only an ethical
debate about the relevance of this involvement but also
a methodological debate about the weight that should be
given to their statements, or rather, the degree of par-
ticipation the public should be granted (advisory-based or
direct intervention). Some fear that public understanding of
rationing could undermine the population’s conﬁdence in
health professionals,5,6 in the National Health System (NHS),
and social cohesion.7
Active public participation in priority setting requires some
transference of power and authority to this group, which
could conﬂict with the interests of other groups, namely the
doctors.8,9 Jacobson and Bowling10 point out that the public
debate on rationing is complicated by the inherent conﬂicts
between the opinions of the general population and those of
the health professionals or groups of patients. A further cause
for worry in the question of public involvement in prioriti-
sation decisions is the general population’s lack of technical
11,12knowledge. Some authors point out that there is the risk
of this process being dominated by uninformed people.9,13,14
These aspects raise doubts about the value or the weight
that should be attributed to the opinions of the population.15direitos reservados.
According to Mullen12 the lack of deﬁnition concerning the
population’s role in the prioritisation process negatively con-
ditions the results of their involvement.
Paradoxically, public involvement in the rationing debate
encounters resistance in the population itself. Studies have
shown that despite the citizens’ wish to be consulted about
health resources planning, they do not want to make direct
rationing decisions themselves.16–21 The population seems to
experience disutility when it ﬁnds out about, or is called upon
to make decisions about the denial of treatments to other
members of society21 due to a fear of making a wrong deci-
sion, which they may later come to regret.22 It would seem
that regret is an important element in individual valorisa-
tion and in making decisions about health care.19 This idea
is reinforced by evidence that the citizens derive utility from
ignoringhow thehealth resources are effectively rationalised –
the “utility of ignorance” argument.5,23 In addition, individuals
tend to see doctors as the best group to make the decisions for
society.20,24,25 This would seem to suggest that in the interests
of “peace ofmind”, the rationing decisions should be left to the
doctors, whatever they decide.26
The paper presents the results of a survey questioning
citizens (college students) in Portugal about their opinion
towards the public’s involvement in the planning for limited
health resources, their designated decision-making authority
for rationing, and their level of consent for the adoption of
efﬁciency criteria in the allocation of resources
Rationing of health care in Portugal
Rationing in Portugal is not explicitly addressed in the polit-
ical agenda. As is happening in other developed countries,
the shortage of resources in the Portuguese NHS has become
increasingly serious in recent years, especially with the
increase in health costs. The reforms that have been carried
out since the mid 1990s, with the main purpose of improving
efﬁciency and controlling the increases in health costs, adopt
a typology of rationing which is a mixture of explicit measures
taken at the macro level and implicit practices remaining the
responsibility of the health care providers. In this sense, the
rationing practiced in Portugal has not involved the popula-
tion in any way, not even at the basic level of public debate.
Only sporadic cases, such as the closure of particular support
services or maternity units which were given full media cov-
erage, have recently sparked some resistance on the part of
public opinion.There is very little information available about the pre-
ferences of the Portuguese population on matters relating
to health services. For a revision, see Mossialos,27 Pinto and
Aragão28 and Lopes and Magalhães.29 The actual issue of
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xplicit rationing is not approached in these studies, with
he exception of the work done by Pinto and Aragão28 under
n European project, where a survey was carried out with a
epresentative sample of the population on issues such as
ransparency and the framework for prioritisation decisions.
egarding transparency, the citizens were questioned about
he usefulness of a public debate on health care rationing.
he majority (71.6%) of interviewees responded afﬁrmatively.
oncerning the framework that should uphold the rationing,
he interviewees were given three options to choose from. The
ost popular option was the personal decision of the doctors
34.1%), followed by the political decision (29.5%) and, ﬁnally,
he relation between the cost of the care and the medical ben-
ﬁts (29.3%). In comparison to Pinto and Aragão’s survey, our
tudy introduces a wider scope in terms of decision-making
uthorities and the level of social actors’ intervention and,
urthermore, tests for coherence in the respondents’ choices.
ethodology
his study was organised according to four main objectives:
rstly, to collect evidence on citizen’s desire to have a more
ctive role in questions relating to rationing; secondly, to
xamine whether citizens in Portugal conform with ﬁndings
n international studies reporting doctors to be the best agents
or making prioritisation decisions; thirdly, to understand the
eterminants of this choice; and ﬁnally, to collect evidence
n popular acceptance of economic evaluation criteria as a
ramework for priority setting.
A questionnaire was conducted in a controlled environ-
ent with a sample of 442 college students (arguably, future
pinion leaders) from public and private institutions located
n the north and the centre of the country. The sample
ncluded students from different programmes, namely Eco-
omics,Management, Psychology, Law,Medicine andNursing.
lthough this is not a representative sample of the Portuguese
opulation in general, we believe that students’ attitudes
an be cautiously (because they lack professional experience)
aken as an indicator of the attitudes of the corresponding
rofessionals. This study has the advantage of allowing the
omparison of groups that, although of the same age and with
he same level of education, fall into different scientiﬁc ﬁelds.
o date no other study has compared the opinion of so many
ifferent groups. The studies have limited their scope to com-
aring the opinions of doctors and the population,30 or the
ttitudes of different groups of politicians.31
The questionnaire was designed to include three ques-
ions which have been properly justiﬁed in international
tudies.14,32 Anand and Wailoo32 tested the robustness of the
heory of non-consequential social choice, as an alternative
pproach to economic efﬁciency, using a non-representative
ample of the population in Leicester (United Kingdom). There
re two questions in this questionnaire that deserve particular
ttention here. In one of the questions, the authors’ purpose
as to evaluate the relevance of health authorities adopting a
rocess of public consultation to determine health care plan-
ing. The answers obtained suggest a general support for this
onsultancy process. In the other question, the authors aimed013;31(2):179–187 181
to ﬁnd out which opinion should prevail in the case of dis-
agreement between the doctors and the general population
about the ﬁnancing of a certain health programme/service.
The authors recreated a scenario in which the public ﬁnan-
cing of a speciﬁc treatment had been approved by referendum.
The doctors, however, found that the limited health gains (efﬁ-
ciency) did not justify the channelling of resources into the
provision of this particular service. The results corroborated
the authors’ hypothesis by indicating that the population’s
opinion is preferred by 48% of the interviewees against only
33% who prefer the criteria of maximisation of health gains.
Mossialos and King14 discuss the questions raised in rela-
tion to public involvement in prioritisation decisions, and
analyse data collected about the attitude of the citizens
towards rationing using the Eurobarometer n◦ 49.33 The Euro-
barometer questionnaire included speciﬁc questions about
rationing, and was conducted using representative samples
from six EU countries (Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Great
Britain andSweden). Theauthorsused thedata to compare the
attitudes of the citizens from these six countries. The question
in this Eurobarometer questionnaire that is of interest to the
purposes of our study aimed to ﬁnd out which agent the soci-
eties would nominate to make prioritisation decisions. From a
list of ﬁve potential actors (doctors, population, nurses, hospi-
tal managers and politicians), the doctors were the consistent
choice in these countries.
In our study, these three questions are used together in one
questionnaire. The simultaneous use of these three questions
allows an identiﬁcation of the respondents’ understanding of
what constitutes an adequate level of public involvement as
well as their support for the results of an economic evalua-
tion. Our ﬁrst question aims to ﬁnd out if the students think
that the population should be involved in the process of health
care rationing. The answer to this question does not allow an
assessment of the extent of public involvement. Thus, our sec-
ond question aims to determine the respondents’ opinion on
who should be the decision-making authority in healthcare
prioritisation. Given a list of potential social actors (people in
general, doctors, nurses, hospital managers and politicians),
the respondents are questioned about who they think should
be responsible for ﬁxing limits in health care provision. Con-
trary to the Eurobarometer questionnaire,33 we deliberately
opted to deny the respondents the possibility of giving multi-
ple responses, forcing them to state the actor they considered
the most important from among the different groups.
The responses obtained to these twoquestionsdonot allow
the identiﬁcation of the principles guiding the respondents’
choices. That is, their opinions about whether or not the pub-
lic should be involved in priority setting, and who should be
the actual decision makers, do not allow the identiﬁcation of
whether respondents’ are indifferent to the criteria used by
the chosen decision maker to make prioritisation decisions.
The addition of a third question in this questionnaire exploring
the potential conﬂict between popular opinion and doctors’
opinion based on the principle of health gain maximisation
allows such identiﬁcation, shedding light on whether the pre-
ferences for doctors as decision makers reported in previous
studies is maintained even when doctors adopt economic
criteria.
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Table 1 – Survey questions and results by college degree.
Questions Econo (%) Manag (%) Law (%) Psycol (%) Medic (%) Nurse (%) Total
Q1. Some people argue that health authorities should conduct consultation exercises (public meetings, asking groups made up from the public)
to determine what health care treatments are provided. Do you agree?
• Agree 74.29 78.64 82.50 92.73 68.00 96.83 80.50
• Disagree 22.86 16.50 15.00 1.82 30.67 3.17 16.55
• Neutral 2.86 4.85 2.50 5.45 1.33 0.00 2.95
Q2. If limits need to be set, who should decide which types of treatment are given a higher priority?
• General public 14.29 18.45 17.50 30.91 6.67 17.46 16.78
• Doctors 63.81 51.46 67.50 65.45 72.00 23.81 57.14
• Nurses 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
• Managers of health services 20.95 16.50 10.00 1.82 1.33 3.17 10.66
• Politicians 0.95 3.88 2.50 1.82 0.00 3.17 2.04
• Spontaneous response –“multidisciplinary” 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.00 52.38 10.88
• Don’t know 0.00 9.71 2.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.49
Q3. If a health authority conducts a poll, which shows that, the majority of people think that a particular treatment should be provided, but doctors argue
that it is rarely successful and should not be provided, what to you thing should happen?
• The treatment should be provided 18.10 38.83 35.00 45.45 6.67 25.81 27.05
• The treatment should not be provided 72.38 52.43 57.50 34.55 89.33 58.06 62.50
8.74
3• Don’t know 9.52
N 105 10
Results
Our analysis of the data focuses on the effects of different
academic training on respondents’ attitudes, and is organised
by examining in order: (A) opinions concerning public involve-
ment in the process of priority setting, (B) opinions concerning
the prioritisation decision-making agents, and (C) opinions
concerning the decision-criteria or mode of priority setting.
Public involvement
Table 1 presents the questions posed in the questionnaire,
and the main results. Irrespective of their academic training,
the majority of the respondents are favourable to the idea of
public involvement in the process of priority setting. Nonethe-
less, the future nurses showed themselves to be the strongest
defenders of public participation, while the medical students
were the strongest opponents (30.7%).
The application of the Pearson’s 2 test shows that there is
a signiﬁcant statistical association between the distribution
of answers to the ﬁrst question and students’ college pro-
gramme (2(10) = 37.554; p-value<0.001; all the Pearson’s 2 test
results are corroborated by Fisher’s exact test). This effect is
supported by the estimation results of a binary logit model,
in which the dependent variable takes the value of one if the
respondent agrees with public consultation and the value of
zero otherwise. Because college students aredifferent (despite,
in general, not being very different in terms of age, income
brackets, or life experiences), in addition to dummy variables
identifying students’ academic training (our focus variables)
we include in themodel as control variables socio-demographic
characteristics, health conditions and habits, political party
and religious afﬁliation, all ofwhichmayalso impact students’
opinions and, therefore, confound the effects of the respon-
dents’ college programme. Table 2 shows the deﬁnition and
the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis.7.50 20.00 4.00 16.13 10.45
40 55 75 63 441
Table 3 shows the marginal effects of the selected variables
on theprobability of agreementwith public consultation in the
process of priority setting. The results indicate that students
of Economics and Management do not differentiate them-
selves from Law students (the omitted group). The students
of Psychology and Nursing have a higher and statistically sig-
niﬁcant probability of agreeing with public consultation than
the students of Law, at around 12 and 10 percentage points,
respectively. As previously suggested,Medicine students show
a lower probability of agreement than Law students, by about
14 percentage points (unilateral p-value is about 5%). This
resistance to the public involvement in the process of priority
setting on the part of the medical students seems to corrobo-
rate those who defend that there is a conﬂict between medical
paternalism and social participation.9
Decision-makers
Concerning the second question in the questionnaire, the
majority of respondents (57%) believe that doctors should
be the main agents for healthcare prioritisation decisions
(Table 1). The results also seem to indicate that society does
not trust politicians to make those decisions. After the doc-
tors, the respondents elected the general public (17%) as the
decision-making agent, albeit at a signiﬁcantly distance from
the doctors (the test for equality of proportions yields a statis-
tic z=−12.416with a p-value<0.001). The preferences revealed
by our sample are, in general, consistent with those obtained
by Mossialos and King14 and Pinto and Aragão.28 Although
multiple answers were not permitted in our study, 10.9% of
our interviewees responded spontaneously that the prioriti-
sation decisions should be made by a multidisciplinary team.
The nursing students (52.4%) and the medical students (20%)
were alone in opting to give this spontaneous answer.
Table 4 presents the marginal effects of the explanatory
variables on the probability of selecting each one of the
alternatives considered. As would be expected, the results
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Table 2 – Deﬁnition of variables and descriptive statistics for the sample.
Variables Description Mean (sd)
Law Dummy variable equal to 1 if law student, 0 otherwise 0.09
Economics Dummy variable equal to 1 if economics student, 0 otherwise 0.24
Management Dummy variable equal to 1 if management student, 0 otherwise 0.24
Psychology Dummy variable equal to 1 if psychology student, 0 otherwise 0.12
Medicine Dummy variable equal to 1 if medicine student, 0 otherwise 0.17
Nursing Dummy variable equal to 1 if nursing student, 0 otherwise 0.14
Male Dummy variable equal to 1 if male, 0 otherwise 0.43
Age Age in years 24.30 (7.26)
Single Dummy variable equal to 1 if single, 0 otherwise 0.85
Nfamily Number of people in the individual’s household 3.58 (1.05)
Inc1 Dummy variable equal to 1 if household income group of the individual is below the sample average, 0
otherwise
0.50
Inc2 Dummy variable equal to 1 if household income group of the individual is equal to the sample average, 0
otherwise
0.13
Inc3 Dummy variable equal to 1 if household income group of the individual is above the sample average, 0
otherwise
0.37
Insurance Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual has private health insurance, 0 otherwise 0.37
Smoker Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual currently smokes, 0 otherwise 0.33
Ncigs Typical number of cigarettes the individual smokes per day 2.96 (6.06)
Drinker Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual currently drinks alcoholic beverages, 0 otherwise 0.70
Chronic Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual reports suffering from a chronic disease, 0 otherwise 0.10
Severe Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual reports having suffered (or anyone in his/her household) from a
severe disease, 0 otherwise
0.35
Religion Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual holds religious views, 0 otherwise 0.78
CP Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual favours the communist party, 0 otherwise 0.02
LB Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual favours the left-bloc party, 0 otherwise 0.05
PP Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual favours the people’s party, 0 otherwise 0.03
SDP Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual favours the social-democratic party, 0 otherwise 0.24
SP Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual favours the socialist party, 0 otherwise 0.24
OtherP Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual favours other party, 0 otherwise 0.03
NoP Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual does not favour any political party, 0 otherwise 0.39
Table 3 – Binomial logit estimates of probability of agreeing with public consultation.
Variable Estimate SE p-value 95% conﬁdence intervals
Focus variables:
Economics −0.032 0.060 0.589 −0.150 0.085
Management 0.012 0.055 0.827 −0.095 0.119
Psychology 0.121 0.031 0.000 0.061 0.181
Medicine −0.139 0.084 0.099 −0.305 0.026
Nursing 0.097 0.038 0.011 0.022 0.173
Control variables:
Male −0.114 0.034 0.001 −0.181 −0.047
Age 0.003 0.004 0.403 −0.004 0.011
Single 0.281 0.163 0.086 −0.040 0.601
Nfamily 0.014 0.015 0.359 −0.016 0.043
Inc2 −0.046 0.059 0.429 −0.161 0.068
Inc3 −0.081 0.039 0.038 −0.158 −0.004
Insurance 0.057 0.029 0.044 0.002 0.113
Smoker −0.059 0.047 0.211 −0.151 0.033
Ncigs 0.003 0.003 0.431 −0.004 0.009
Drinker 0.055 0.036 0.135 −0.017 0.126
Chronic 0.041 0.041 0.323 −0.040 0.122
Severe −0.033 0.031 0.277 −0.094 0.027
Religion 0.039 0.038 0.307 −0.036 0.114
LB −0.940 0.009 0.000 −0.958 −0.922
PP −0.920 0.012 0.000 −0.943 −0.896
SDP −0.994 0.001 0.000 −0.996 −0.991
SP −0.993 0.001 0.000 −0.996 −0.991
OtherP −0.912 0.013 0.000 −0.937 −0.888
NoP −0.995 0.002 0.000 −0.999 −0.991
Note: N=433 responses; Log-pseudolikelihood value is −173.82; Wald test for the null hypothesis that all coefﬁcients are zero has a 2 value of
727.70 with 24 df, implying a p-value less than 0.001.
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Table 4 – Multinomial logit estimates – Q2.
Variable General public Doctors Others/don’t know
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Focus variables:
Q1-Disagree −0.207** 0.032 0.016 0.242 0.191 0.246
Q1-Agree −0.002 0.016 −0.159 0.135 0.161 0.136
Economics −0.004 0.010 −0.081 0.117 0.084 0.117
Management 0.003 0.011 −0.280** 0.129 0.277** 0.131
Psychology 0.020 0.020 0.174** 0.089 −0.194** 0.087
Medicine −0.014** 0.007 −0.066 0.121 0.080 0.122
Nursing −0.003 0.010 −0.541** 0.110 0.544** 0.113
Control variables:
Male 0.005 0.007 0.046 0.057 −0.051 0.056
Age 0.001 0.001 −0.004 0.006 0.004 0.006
Single 0.011 0.008 −0.230** 0.075 0.219** 0.074
Nfamily 0.003 0.003 −0.025 0.026 0.022 0.026
Inc2 −0.007 0.008 0.215** 0.048 −0.208** 0.047
Inc3 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.061 −0.008 0.060
Insurance −0.012** 0.006 −0.035 0.058 0.047 0.058
Smoker 0.008 0.010 −0.150* 0.084 0.142* 0.084
Ncigs −0.001 0.001 −0.004 0.007 0.005 0.007
Drinker 0.002 0.006 −0.085 0.055 0.083 0.054
Chronic 0.001 0.010 −0.043 0.085 0.042 0.085
Severe 0.002 0.006 0.062 0.052 −0.064 0.051
Religion 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.067 −0.010 0.067
LB 0.023 0.044 0.091 0.179 −0.113 0.169
PP 0.024 0.051 0.206** 0.089 −0.230** 0.061
SDP 0.008 0.024 0.095 0.195 −0.103 0.191
SP 0.023 0.032 0.023 0.216 −0.047 0.210
OtherP 0.040 0.066 −0.162 0.311 0.122 0.316
NoP 0.013 0.022 0.098 0.211 −0.111 0.207
Note: N=432 responses; Log-pseudolikelihood value is −343.38; Wald test for the null hypothesis that all coefﬁcients are zero has a 2 value of
6126.83 with 52 df, implying a p-value less than 0.001. Hausman speciﬁcation test for the IIA assumption has 2 value of 1.14 with 17 df, yielding
no evidence that the IIA assumption has been violated.
∗ p-value≤ .10 (two-tailed test).
∗∗ p-value≤ .05 (two-tailed test).
show that the individuals who disagree with public consul-
tations (Q1-Disagree) are less likely to select the public as
the decision-maker in priority setting than those individuals
who remain neutral concerning public consultations. Like-
wise, Medical students are less likely to select the public as
the decision-maker in priority setting than Law students. The
results concerning the choice of doctors reveal that Man-
agement and Nursing students exhibit a lower probability of
choosing the doctors as the decision-makers than Law stu-
dents. In both cases, however, the choice does not fall on the
public as the decision-maker but on other professionals. Inter-
estingly, Psychology students have, ceteris paribus, a higher
probability of choosing the doctors as the decision-makers in
priority setting. Thus, although this group is the one that most
favours the public consultation, they do not select the public,
but thedoctors, as thedecision-makers, revealing that a strong
preference for the public involvement in the priority process
does not translate into a preference for its actual participative
role in the process.Mode of prioritisation
An analysis of the responses to the third question allows us to
conclude that, in the case of conﬂict, the respondents selectthe opinion of the doctors, reinforcing the previous conclu-
sions. These results contrast with the ﬁndings of Anand and
Wailoo.32 In theirwork, respondents reveal amuchhigher ten-
dency to disagree with the health maximisation principle as
defended by doctors. Table 5 presents the marginal effects of
the selected variables on the probability of favouring the opin-
ion of the doctors. The results indicate that, compared to the
individualswho selected ‘Other Professionals’ in Question 2 or
declared themselves neutral, those individuals who selected
the general public as the decision-maker in priority setting
(Q2-Public) are 33.5 percentage points less likely to favour the
opinion of the doctors in the case of conﬂict with public opin-
ion. Ceteris paribus, the Psychology students also exhibit a
27 percentage point’s lower probability of agreeing with the
opinion of the doctors than the Law students, while Medicine
students exhibit a 29.5 percentage point’s higher probability
of agreeing with the opinion of the doctors than the Law stu-
dents.
One important result from this analysis is the lack of a sta-
tistically signiﬁcant effect of the variable Q2-Doctors on the
probability of agreeing with the opinion of the doctors. It
would be expected that, irrespective of the academic back-
ground, those individuals who select the doctors (public) as
the decision-maker in priority setting would also favour the
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Table 5 – Binomial logit estimates of probability of favouring the doctors’ opinion.
Variable Estimate SE p-value 95% conﬁdence intervals
Focus variables:
Q2-Public −0.335 0.088 0.000 −0.508 −0.162
Q2-Doctors 4×10−4 0.065 0.995 −0.127 0.128
Economics 0.124 0.087 0.152 −0.046 0.293
Management −0.105 0.104 0.310 −0.309 0.098
Psychology −0.267 0.135 0.048 −0.531 −0.003
Medicine 0.295 0.065 0.000 0.168 0.422
Nursing 0.058 0.099 0.562 −0.137 0.252
Control variables:
Male 0.069 0.060 0.255 −0.050 0.187
Age 0.002 0.006 0.728 −0.010 0.014
Single 0.193 0.120 0.107 −0.042 0.428
Nfamily −0.045 0.027 0.088 −0.098 0.007
Inc2 0.187 0.061 0.002 0.067 0.306
Inc3 0.102 0.062 0.101 −0.020 0.223
Insurance −0.080 0.061 0.187 −0.199 0.039
Smoker −0.032 0.085 0.704 −0.199 0.134
Ncigs 0.012 0.006 0.044 0.000 0.024
Drinker 0.115 0.060 0.057 −0.003 0.233
Chronic 0.190 0.065 0.004 0.062 0.319
Severe −0.019 0.056 0.737 −0.129 0.092
Religion 0.014 0.064 0.831 −0.112 0.140
LB −0.514 0.138 0.000 −0.784 −0.244
PP −0.347 0.222 0.117 −0.781 0.087
SDP −0.478 0.175 0.006 −0.821 −0.135
SP −0.480 0.173 0.005 −0.819 −0.142
NoP −0.466 0.170 0.006 −0.799 −0.132
Note: N=420 responses; Log-pseudolikelihood value is −228.07; Wald test for the null hypothesis that all coefﬁcients are zero has a 2 value
of 73.76 with 25 df, implying a p-value less than 0.001. Explanatory variable OtherP was dropped due to perfect prediction of the dependent
variable.
Table 6 – Binomial logit estimates of probability of disagreeing with adopted criteria.
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Disagree with doctors Disagree with public
Estimate SE p-value 95% CI Estimate SE p-value 95% CI
Focus variables:
Economics −0.081 0.082 0.326 −0.242 0.080 −0.638 0.161 0.000 −0.953 −0.323
Management 0.043 0.102 0.673 −0.157 0.243 −0.606 0.187 0.001 −0.973 −0.239
Psychology 0.359 0.163 0.028 0.040 0.679 −0.493 0.231 0.033 −0.945 −0.040
Medicine −0.263 0.061 0.000 −0.382 −0.144 −0.267 0.305 0.381 −0.864 0.330
Nursing −0.125 0.087 0.150 −0.294 0.045 −0.369 0.257 0.151 −0.873 0.135
Control variables:
Male −0.041 0.068 0.546 −0.174 0.092 0.162 0.235 0.491 −0.299 0.622
Age −0.004 0.007 0.574 −0.017 0.009 −0.056 0.019 0.003 −0.092 −0.019
Single −0.182 0.148 0.218 −0.472 0.107 0.303 0.303 0.316 −0.290 0.897
Nfamily 0.052 0.032 0.108 −0.011 0.114 −0.272 0.100 0.007 −0.469 −0.076
Inc2 −0.114 0.064 0.072 −0.239 0.010 0.454 0.131 0.001 0.198 0.710
Inc3 0.007 0.072 0.924 −0.134 0.148 0.427 0.184 0.020 0.067 0.786
Insurance 0.071 0.067 0.289 −0.060 0.203 −0.332 0.203 0.102 −0.730 0.066
Smoker 0.039 0.100 0.693 −0.157 0.236 0.215 0.291 0.460 −0.355 0.785
Ncigs −0.012 0.008 0.117 −0.028 0.003 0.063 0.022 0.004 0.021 0.106
Drinker −0.087 0.075 0.250 −0.235 0.061 0.670 0.114 0.000 0.447 0.894
Chronic −0.197 0.057 0.001 −0.309 −0.084 −0.469 0.152 0.002 −0.767 −0.171
Severe −0.028 0.065 0.666 −0.154 0.099 0.189 0.217 0.382 −0.235 0.614
Religion 0.042 0.068 0.536 −0.091 0.176 0.005 0.265 0.984 −0.515 0.525
LB 0.882 0.021 0.000 0.840 0.923 0.695 0.079 0.000 0.541 0.850
PP 0.843 0.027 0.000 0.791 0.896 0.570 0.098 0.000 0.377 0.762
SDP 0.995 0.002 0.000 0.992 0.998 0.873 0.051 0.000 0.773 0.972
SP 0.987 0.003 0.000 0.982 0.993 0.965 0.022 0.000 0.922 1.007
NoP 0.999 0.000 0.000 0.998 1.000 0.983 0.013 0.000 0.957 1.008
Note: N=240 (70) responses for model 1 (model 2); Log-pseudolikelihood value is −120.22 (−28.50) for model 1 (model 2); Wald test for the null
hypothesis that all coefﬁcients are zero has a 2 value of 582.70 (225.44) with 23 df, implying a p-value less than 0.001 for model 1 (model 2).
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opinion of the doctors (public) in the case of conﬂict in the
adopted prioritisation criteria. We did not explore the rea-
sons behind this apparent contradiction. One hypothesis is
that individuals may fear that in the future some treatments
may be denied on the basis of economic criteria, but an inves-
tigation of these reasons must be left for future work. At any
rate, this result suggests that the dominant choice for doctors
as the main decision-makers in priority setting observed in
international samples may not be independent of the decision
criteria adopted by them in the allocation of resources.
As an attempt to better identify the groups that exhibit this
behaviour, Table 6 shows the factors that inﬂuence the proba-
bility of disagreeing with the criteria adopted by the selected
actors for priority setting. Model 1 is estimated using the sub-
sample of individuals that selected the doctors as the main
decision-makers in priority setting and Model 2 is estimated
using the subsample of individuals that selected the general
public as the main decision-maker. Concerning the individ-
uals who selected the general public as the decision-makers
in priority setting, it is found that the students of Economics,
Management and Psychology have a lower probability of dis-
agreeing with public opinion in the case of conﬂict with the
“maximizing” criteria adopted by the doctors. Importantly, the
results of model 1 indicate that it is the Psychology students
(Medicine) who, having selected the doctors as the decision-
makers, have a higher (lower) probability of disagreeing with
the criteria adopted by the doctors in these decisions. Taken
together, these results, particularly in the case of the Psychol-
ogy students, reveal that a strong preference for doctors as
the prioritisation decision-makers is not a mere translation of
a “peace of mind” argument.
Conclusion
Health care rationing is a complex and controversial issue.
Recent discussions on the theme have focused on whether
rationing, which occurs in virtually all public health systems,
should assume an explicit character and what level of public
involvement the process should have.
This study attempts to contribute to the debate on public
participation in the allocation of limited health care resources
in Portugal, where there is an increasingly urgent need to
establish limits on what is publicly ﬁnanced. The results
obtained in this study indicate that the Portuguese respon-
dents are calling for public involvement in the process of
priority setting. However, and in accordance with various
international studies, the results also suggest that the domi-
nant preference is to give the public an advisory role and not a
participative role, with prioritisation decisions being primar-
ily conferred on the doctors. One important result in our study
is the ﬁnding that the Portuguese doctors (taking medical stu-
dents’ opinion as indicators) do not reject the responsibility of
priority setting decisions. Using the taxonomy of Obermann
and Buck,26 the overall results suggest that the Portuguese
would opt for an “open” process of priority setting in what
concerns public involvement.
In relation to the second aspect of this taxonomy, i.e. the
mode of prioritisation, contrary to what has been observed in
various international studies, the Portuguese respondents in. 2013;31(2):179–187
our study revealed a clear preference for the health gains crite-
ria adopted by the doctors over the criteria defended by the
public. The results therefore suggest that Portuguese choose
a “systematic” process for the mode of priority setting. The
robustness of this result ismeasured in our study by a compar-
ison between the stated preferences for the decision-maker
and the stated preferences for the decision criteria. If the
choice for doctors (or other professionals) as decision-makers
is a mere translation of the “utility of ignorance” argument,
a concurrence between the choice of the decision-maker and
the criteria – whatever they may be adopted by the decision-
maker – should be observed. This concurrence was not totally
observed in our study. Only 44% of the respondents who
selected the general public as the decision-maker explicitly
agreed with its criteria for the allocation of resources, and
about 70% of thosewho selected the professionals agreedwith
the cost-effectiveness criteria adopted by the doctors in the
given scenario. It was further veriﬁed that it is the future doc-
tors who showed a higher probability of agreeing with the
cost-effectiveness criteria. These respondents also showed a
lower probability of disagreeing with these criteria than all
the other respondents who selected the doctors as the priori-
tisation decision-making agents.
Thus, although a total adherence to cost-effectiveness
criteria is not observed, the results obtained in this question-
naire indicate that, in complete opposition to the “state of
the art” in Portugal in matters of health care rationing (char-
acterised as “hidden and non-systematic”), the process that
emerges as the “best solution” for the country is the “open and
systematic” rationing characterised by Obermann and Buck26
as: (a) the public calls for “open” rationing, and (b) requires
rigour in its formulation, comprises economic criteria, it is
accepted by the doctors, and conforms with the preferences
of the majority of the population. Naturally, this result must
be read within the context of the limitations of the sample
used, but it still constitutes an indication of an existing con-
tradiction in Portugal between the political option that has
been adopted in rationing and the aspirations of the popula-
tion, suggesting an urgent need for an open debate and a large
and representative consultation of the Portuguese population
on these matters.
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